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“When people thought the earth was flat, they were wrong. When people thought 
the earth was spherical, they were wrong. But if you think that thinking the earth is 
spherical is just as wrong as thinking the earth is flat, then your view is wronger than 
both of them put together.”  
-- Isaac Asimov1 
 
Recently, Diong2 wrote a commentary for the Scandinavian Journal of Medicine and Science 
in Sports critiquing a study by Pamboris and colleagues3 for not correctly interpreting confidence 
intervals that contained zero. Pamboris and colleagues4 wrote a response letter in return, seeking to 
rebut Diong’s critique and arguing that they were appropriately implementing Magnitude-Based 
Inference (MBI), which they argue is “based on Bayesian inference and [the] conclusions are 
robust.”4 They neglect, however, that multiple statisticians5-7 including Bayesian statisticians8,9 have 
strongly critiqued and even called for rejection of MBI as a method of inference. In this commentary, 
we hope to resolve some of that ambiguity and concisely explain why MBI is not a robust method of 
statistical inference.  
 In their response letter, Pamboris and colleagues4 correctly note that Diong2 defined 
confidence intervals inaccurately. However, Diong’s definitional error does not undermine her 
central argument, which is that the original authors have reached conclusions that are not justified 
by the data. Pamboris and colleagues compared slow dynamic stretching (SDS) to fast dynamic 
stretching (FDS) in an 18-person crossover design.3 They concluded that “SDS showed greater 
improvement than FDS in both neuromechanical and sensorimotor performance,” but the 
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variation due to sampling variability, as we will show. As with numerous papers in the sport and 
exercise literature, the use of MBI led the authors to reach overly optimistic conclusions.  
Pamboris and colleagues4 claim that their conclusions are justified because the 
“interpretation of our results was according to the recommended MBI procedures,” but MBI is not 
an established statistical method. To date, MBI has never been published in a statistical journal10-12 
nor have equations with formal notation ever been provided. Instead, MBI is implemented in 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, solely available from www.sportsci.org, with no clear documentation 
or version control.13-14 Pamboris and colleagues4 also fail to cite the numerous critiques of MBI from 
statisticians in the academic literature5-9 and in the popular press.15-16 Further, their arguments 
neglect that MBI has been questioned or outright banned by major sports medicine journals.17-18 
Prima facie, this evidence should make one skeptical about the legitimacy of MBI. Using the 
Pamboris and colleagues paper3 as a motivating example, we will give a brief review of MBI and 
explain why it is not a robust method of inference. 
What is MBI? 
As a method, MBI arose from an understandable desire to put more emphasis on effect sizes 
and estimation. MBI classifies results into three categories of effect size: harmful (or negative), 
trivial, and beneficial (or positive). Pamboris and colleagues3 defined as trivial any values between -
0.2 and +0.2 in standardized effect size units, the default values recommended by MBI’s creators,10-11 
and, in our experience, the values selected by the vast majority of MBI practitioners.  
MBI next assigns probabilities that the true effect is either beneficial (positive), trivial, or 
harmful (negative). For example, Pamboris and colleagues3 report a 74% chance that SDS improves 
positional error relative to FDS (their Table 33). These probabilities are derived from an 
interpretation of confidence intervals and p-values that we will demonstrate is incorrect. In the MBI 
Excel spreadsheets, MBI calculates one-sided p-values from standard hypothesis tests.5 The one-
sided p-value for benefit gives the probability that the observed data (or values more extreme) 
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value of .10 tells us that an effect at least as large as the one in our sample had a 10% chance of 
arising if the intervention was not beneficial. This can be written as: 
P-value = P(data|true effect≤0.2) = 10% 
Recall that the “|” symbol means “given that” or “conditioned on.” Also, note that for 
simplicity, we will use “data” to denote the observed value and all values more extreme. As is taught 
in all introductory statistics classes, the p-value does not tell us the probability that the true effect is 
beneficial or not beneficial given the data: 
P(true effect≤0.2|data) ≠ P(data|true effect≤0.2) ≠ 10% 
Yet, this is exactly how MBI interprets it. MBI concludes that there is a 10% chance that the 
intervention is not beneficial and a 90% chance that it is beneficial. Interpreting p-values in this way 
is equivalent to interpreting frequentist confidence intervals as if they were Bayesian credible 
intervals; we will later show why this is incorrect.  
Interestingly, Pamboris and colleagues appear to be unaware of the math underlying the 
spreadsheets as they state in their response letter4 that their inferences “have nothing whatsoever 
to do with NHST [null hypothesis significance testing].” In fact, the MBI probabilities are calculated 
based on standard hypothesis tests. The spreadsheets used by Pamboris and colleagues implement 
two one-sided t-tests with non-zero null values.5 This was shown mathematically by Welsh & 
Knight5. To confirm this, we simulated data from a randomized trial with n=10 per group and a 
normally distributed outcome (with standard deviation 1.0 and means of 0.1 and 0 in the 
experimental and control groups, respectively). When we analyzed these data in the MBI 
spreadsheet for comparing two means (xCompare2groups.xls), we got a probability beneficial of 
35.603%. When we ran Welch’s t-test for unequal variances with Ho=0.2 and one-sided (for benefit) 
in SAS version 9.4, we got a p-value of 0.64397. 1-.64397=.35603.  
MBI provides the following qualitative descriptors for the probabilities: 0.5% is most 
unlikely; 0.5–5% is very unlikely; 5–25% is unlikely; 25–75% is possible; 75–95% is likely; 95–99.5% is 
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harm and benefit are both elevated, typically ≥5%, which is equivalent to the 90% confidence 
interval overlapping both the harmful and trivial ranges. Accordingly, in their tables, Pamboris and 
colleagues3 label effects as “unlikely,” “possible,” “likely,” “very likely,” and “unclear.” 
 
How have statisticians criticized MBI? 
 Statisticians have noted several problems with MBI, including that it lacks a sound 
mathematical foundation, incorrectly interprets frequentist statistics (p-values and confidence 
intervals), and gives overly optimistic inferences, increasing the risk of finding spurious effects, 
especially when using small samples.  
MBI was first introduced in the peer-reviewed literature in 2006.10 The method was later 
criticized in the same journal by the statisticians Richard Barker and Matthew Schofield, who argued 
that the only way to make probabilistic statements about true effects—such as “There is a 90% 
chance that the intervention is beneficial”—is to adopt a fully Bayesian approach.8 They also noted 
that MBI draws incorrect, and overly optimistic, inferences from confidence intervals, as shown in 
Figure 1.  
For example, in the Pamboris study3, participants experienced an average 39.8% 
improvement in muscle strain in the SDS compared with the FDS condition with 90% confidence 
interval of -16.9% to 96.5% (Figure 1). According to MBI methodology, this gives the conclusion that 
SDS is “likely beneficial” compared with FDS. But the correct interpretation of this confidence 
interval (assuming that -16.9% is within the trivial range) is that SDS is “not harmful” relative to FDS 
(Figure 1). As such, concluding that “SDS showed greater improvement than FDS in both 
neuromechanical and sensorimotor performance” is not warranted.  
In 2015, another pair of statisticians—Alan Welsh and Emma Knight—again raised the alarm 
about MBI.5 The mathematical formulas implemented in the MBI spreadsheets are not published 
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spreadsheets. They showed that, among other issues, the method leads to inflated rates of Type I 
error. Recall that Type I errors are false positive errors.     
In response to this critique, MBI’s creators published a 2016 paper in the journal Sports 
Medicine claiming that MBI has better Type I and Type II error rates than standard hypothesis 
testing.19 This claim is dubious at face value, since Type I and Type II error necessarily trade off. 
Indeed, statistician Kristin Sainani (co-author of this paper) used both math and simulation to 
definitively disprove their claim.6 She showed that, for typical usage, MBI yields unacceptably high 
Type I error rates and that MBI’s sample size calculators are tuned to maximize Type I error.  
The crux of Welsh and Knight’s, and Sainani’s arguments is that MBI inflates the risk of 
concluding benefit for ineffective interventions. Like statistical significance testing, MBI provides 
thresholds of evidence. Instead of highlighting p<.05 or p<.01, MBI practitioners highlight “possible” 
or “likely” effects. For example, Pamboris and colleagues3 call out one “likely” and several “possible” 
differences between SDS and FDS (see their Table 33) and use these findings to justify their 
conclusion that “SDS showed greater improvement than FDS in both neuromechanical and 
sensorimotor performance.” But MBI’s evidentiary thresholds are extremely weak.20 Using math and 
simulation, we estimate that—for the way MBI is typically applied in the literature—the “possible” 
bar is comparable to using a significance threshold as high as p<.60; and the “likely” bar is 
comparable to using a significance threshold as high as p<.25.a This means that when an intervention 
is completely ineffective, MBI practitioners will find false positive “possible” effects as much as 60% 
of the time and false positive “likely” effects as much as 25% of the time. Unfortunately, MBI 
practitioners have not been informed that these levels of evidence are weak: Pamboris and 
colleagues, for instance, insist that “our conclusions are robust.”4 
In fact, the evidence that Pamboris and colleagues3 present to support their claims is weak. 
Though Pamboris and colleagues3 did not present standard p-values for their comparisons, it’s easy 
to calculate these from the confidence intervals provided. The p-value gives important information 










This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
significance test. For example, Pamboris and colleagues3 found that SDS has a “likely beneficial” 
effect on muscle strain compared with FDS. We back-calculated the two-sided p-value for this 
comparison (for the null hypothesis of true effect=0) as P(T17≥(39.8%/32.4%) or T17≤(-
39.8%/32.4%))= 0.24.b This means that if there was truly no difference between the conditions, we 
would have seen a difference of 39.8% or bigger in nearly a quarter of studies just by chance. Note 
that all other between-condition comparisons (e.g., torque) were associated with even higher p-
values, meaning they represent even weaker levels of evidence.  
Claims from MBI studies are being propagated in the literature as definitive findings. In their 
discussion section, Pamboris and colleagues3 cite a previous study21 that they say: “found a decrease 
in muscle fascicle strain combined with an increase in muscle stiffness.” This reference is to an MBI 
study that provided similarly weak levels of evidence for its conclusion. Yet, the findings are not 
qualified as being based on weak evidence, but instead are presented as conclusive. When these 
claims are wrong, they are false positive errors.  
MBI’s creators have argued against these various critiques not in the peer-reviewed 
literature, but on their personal website, which is primarily trafficked by sports scientists, not 
statisticians.22 This creates the illusion of an active debate, when in fact MBI has no support from the 
mainstream statistical community. It is important to note, additionally, that their counter-arguments 
have never questioned the math presented by statisticians.5-6,8-9 Rather, in response to these various 
critiques, MBI’s creators have focused on attacking classical frequentism and then shifted their 
description of MBI. In response to Welsh and Knight’s paper5, they wrote that: “MBI is quite possibly 
the ideal frequentist-Bayesian hybrid.”12 More recently they have begun to describe MBI as purely 
Bayesian as a method to avoid critiques of MBI. On their website, they write: 
 “We advise researchers to describe their inferences about magnitudes as the legitimate 
reference Bayes with a dispersed uniform prior when submitting manuscripts to any journal 
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Pamboris and colleagues’ response letter adopts this tactic4, claiming “Our inferences are 
Bayesian” despite never describing the methods as Bayesian in the original paper3. In the sections 
that follow, we will explain what a Bayesian analysis is and why MBI is not a valid Bayesian analysis. 
 
What is a Bayesian Analysis? 
As previously described, p-values give the probability of the observed data (and all more 
extreme values) given a null hypothesis such as “the true effect is not beneficial” or “the true effect 
is 0”: 
P-value = P(data|true effect≤0.2) 
The p-value is not the probability that the true effect is or isn’t beneficial given the data: 
P(data|true effect≤0.2) ≠ P(true effect≤0.2|data) 
The latter quantity is what we’d often like to know, but we cannot infer this probability directly from 
the data. Rather, we have to apply Bayes’ rule, which requires additional information (in red):  
P(true effect≤0.2|data) = 
      |           ≤                      
       
 
The additional information in the numerator is called the “prior probability” and reflects our beliefs 
about the true effect prior to conducting the study. Probabilities about the data are called the 
“likelihood” function. Combining the likelihood function and the prior probability gives the 
“posterior probability,” which is what we want to know. For simplicity, this is often written as: 
posterior ∝ likelihood × prior  
Bayesian analysis of data does not calculate a single probability alone, but instead calculates 
a full probability distribution. Using the posterior probability distribution, Bayesians can compute 
“credible intervals” which give the probability that the true effect falls within a certain range. For 
example, a 90% Bayesian credible interval of -1.5 to 5.0 tells us “There is a 90% chance the true 
effect lies between -1.5 and 5.0.” Interpreting a p-value as a Bayesian posterior probability is 
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Finally, it is important to note that just because a posterior distribution can be calculated, 
that does not make it necessarily valid or reliable. The prior distribution represents an assumption 
about the nature of reality. As with any model assumption, the prior distribution must be explained, 
justified, and tested.  
 
Why is MBI not a Bayesian Analysis? 
The MBI spreadsheets make inferences solely based on frequentist statistics.5 They do not 
implement any type of Bayesian analysis. What MBI does is to interpret frequentist statistics as if 
they were Bayesian statistics. In this section, we will explain why this is not an acceptable approach.  
A defining feature of a Bayesian analysis is the incorporation of a prior probability 
distribution. As previously mentioned, frequentist statistics give probabilities about data given a 
hypothesis (e.g., “The probability of the data if the intervention were equivalent to control is 10%.”). 
The problem is that we would prefer to obtain the probability of a hypothesis given the data (e.g., 
“There is a 90% chance that the intervention is benefcial.”). Bayesian statistical methods calculate 
these probabilities by incorporating additional information beyond what the data alone provide. This 
additional information is called the “prior probability distribution.” As described above, the choice of 
prior can greatly affect the results, particularly when dealing with small samples. 
Pamboris and colleagues equate MBI to “Bayesian inference with a default prior.”4 But 
“default prior” is not sufficient detail for a scientific paper. For example, a common “default” choice 
when comparing means is the Cauchy probability distribution (which looks like a normal distribution 
but has more area in the tails). Even then, there is not a single Cauchy distibution—there are an 
infinite number determined by the distribution’s scale parameter. A Bayesian employing a Cauchy 
prior would perform a sensitivity analysis to determine how the choice of scale parameter affects 
the results. MBI practitioners do not specify a prior and do not reflect on how the choice of prior 










This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
MBI attempts to simply bypass the prior. Rather than using the central Bayesian formula: 
posterior ∝ likelihood × prior, MBI instead assumes that posterior = likelihood in all cases, and thus 
that frequentist p-values and confidence intervals can be given a direct Bayesian interpretation. In 
MBI, p-values are interpreted as Bayesian posterior probabilities or, equivalently, confidence 
intervals are interpreted as Bayesian credible intervals. There are several problems with this: (1) MBI 
users are never required to specify or justify their prior, think about its implications, or perform 
sensitivity analyses to gauge the effect of the choice on their results; and (2) For simple problems, 
such as comparing means with a known standard deviation, confidence intervals are equivalent to 
credible intervals (and p-values to posterior probabilities) when one assumes a “flat” (or “uniform”) 
prior.8,23 But flat priors are unrealistic for most applications in biomedicine and sports science, as we 
will explain below.  
MBI has been described as a Bayesian analysis with a flat prior10, but writings on MBI fail to 
inform users of the implications of a flat prior. A flat prior means that literally all effect sizes are 
equally likely. This is an unrealistic assumption in biomedicine because it implies that almost every 
intervention has a substantial effect, many have impossibly large effects, and all of these effects are 
equally likely.23-25  
A flat prior will almost always lead to overly optimistic inferences because—by starting with the 
assumption that the intervention almost certainly works (has a non-trivial effect)—it stacks the deck 
in favor of finding a non-trivial effect. As Zwet23 writes: “The uniform prior is not realistic at all in the 
context of bio-medical research. Consequently, its use leads to overestimation of the magnitude of 
the regression coefficient and overconfidence about its sign.” As Greenland24 states: “…a flat prior is 
generally nonsensical in scientific terms and suboptimal for both frequentist and Bayesian decision 
and inference; at most flat priors only serve to bound results from optimized or sensible priors.” 
For instance, Pamboris and colleagues3 report that stretching increased isometric torque, a 
measure of muscle force, from 91 to 95 Newton meters (Nm). A flat prior implies that it is just as 










This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
post-stretching torque being 1000 Nm. This is obviously a completely unrealistic assumption. Flat 
priors are particularly unrealistic for sports science as empirical data show that effect sizes in sport 
and exercise science are predominantly small.26-28 In fact, MBI is specifically advertised as a tool that 
is needed because small effects predominate in sports science.22 
Greenland has demonstrated that frequentist p-values and confidence intervals can be 
viewed as providing bounds on Bayesian posterior probabilities when assuming a prior symmetric 
around the null.25 We indeed believe that MBI probabilities provide an upper limit for a Bayesian 
posterior probability. In other words, when MBI returns “50% chance of beneficial” what this 
actually means is that 50% is the maximum chance that the intervention is beneficial. The choice of 
any other prior (assuming priors symmetric around the null) will lead to a lower probability. This 
means that using MBI as currently implemented will almost always present an overly optimistic 
picture of an intervention’s effectiveness.  
 It’s easy to see that interpreting all frequentist confidence intervals as Bayesian credible 
intervals (or, equivalently, interpreting all p-values as Bayesian posterior probabilities) will lead to 
overly optimistic inferences. Just imagine if all the 95% confidence intervals in the medical literature 
were suddenly interpreted as Bayesian credible intervals (as MBI would allow you to do29-31!). This 
would imply that at least 97.5% of all significant beneficial results would represent true positives, 
which runs directly counter to what we know to be true based on the current reproducibility crisis in 
biomedicine.32-35  
Finally, it is important to recognize that MBI’s evidentiary thresholds (e.g., “likely”, 
“possible”) represent weak levels of evidence whether taking a frequentist or Bayesian perspective. 
“Likely” beneficial effects typically correspond to what Bayesians would consider “anecdotal 
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Practical Issues with the Use of MBI  
In addition to the theoretical issues with MBI, we believe that its use encourages poor 
statistical practices. Researchers performing MBI analyses overwhelmingly use the MBI Excel 
spreadsheets. Unfortunately, the black box approach that these spreadsheets promote means that 
researchers are neither exposed to the statistical theory claimed to underpin MBI (Bayesian 
inference), nor the computational procedures involved in generating the test statistics, creating 
confusion regarding the methods used and results produced. For example, in their response letter, 
Pamboris and colleagues4 make the bizarre claim:  
“We have used the pre‐post parallel groups trial spreadsheet, as this calculation tool 
compares the difference from pre- to post-changes between the slow and fast dynamic 
stretching condition thus eliminating type I error”4 (emphasis added). 
 
This statement is erroneous—Type I error is not eliminated by comparing pre- and post-changes. 
Also, their reference to MBI as a “Bayesian analysis with a default prior” without any explanation of 
its implications, suggests a lack of understanding of Bayesian statistics. Finally, their claim that their 
inferences “have nothing whatsoever to do with NHST”4 suggests a lack of awareness that the Excel 
spreadsheets implement standard hypothesis tests.  
MBI encourages this lack of critical thinking, fostering instead the application of “statistical 
rituals.”37 Rather than exercising judgement over the validity of their statistical methods, researchers 
instead heedlessly transcribe results generated through the calculations of the MBI spreadsheets. 
MBI is not alone in operating as a black box (indeed, many programs allow users to implement 
statistical methods the users do not understand), but MBI critically lacks rigorous review and 
documentation. As we have mentioned, MBI’s authors have never presented a mathematical 
formulation of the method and the method has never been published in a statistical journal. MBI’s 
supporting documentation is also limited. Tracking the workflow through the various dependencies 
within the spreadsheets is at once confusing and time-consuming, and subject to following the 
often-verbose instructions and explanations—a “note” attached to one spreadsheet cell is over 800 
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are reviewed, critiqued, and published in the mainstream literature (e.g., the Journal of Statistical 
Software). 
An example of this cookbook approach is in the transformation of variables. In reviewing 
numerous MBI papers, we have noticed that authors commonly log-transform their data with little 
explanation given other than that they did so to “deal with the non-uniformity of errors.”38-43 This 
phrase is not conventional statistical language at all: a Google search reveals that it is used on 
www.sportsci.org and then almost exclusively in MBI papers in the sports medicine literature. In 
most cases, there is no indication that authors have actually examined their data distributions or 
checked assumptions such as normality and homogeneity of variances to warrant a log 
transformation. While it is sometimes appropriate to log-transform, it should not be done 
indiscriminately or without justification. Log transformation can make the results difficult to 
interpret (e.g., what would it mean to say that a certain type of warm-up improves the log of race 
time by 0.8?). Use of logs can also make it harder to check simple numbers, thus making it easier for 
numerical errors and inconsistencies to go undetected.  
Pamboris and colleagues3 log-transformed all but two of their variables, with no explanation 
for these choices. The log transformation makes their tables extremely difficult to follow; and we 
believe has introduced inconsistencies in the inferences. For example, muscle strain changed by -
38.00% in the SDS condition (see their Table 1) and -13.20% in the FDS condition (see their Table 2), 
which—presumably due to the log transformations—somehow translates to a between-condition 
difference of 39.80% (see their Table 3).3 This 39.80% is reported alongside a standardized effect size 
of 0.50, with no explanation of how the standardized effect size was calculated. Worryingly, the 
confidence interval for the raw data, 39.80% ± 56.70%, yields different inferences than the 
confidence interval for the effect size, 0.50 ± 0.89. The back-calculated p-value from the former is 
0.24 but from the latter is 0.32, demonstrating inconsistency. Furthermore, we can use the effect 
size confidence interval to directly calculate the MBI beneficial probability as: p(T17>(0.50-
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it’s unclear as to why the confidence intervals are symmetric: if confidence intervals were built on 
the log-transformed data and then back-transformed (exponentiated), one would expect the 
confidence intervals to be asymmetric.   
 Researchers that use the MBI Excel spreadsheets frequently neglect to provide adequately 
detailed descriptions of their methods, precluding appraisal of their validity. We note that in the 
Statistical Analysis section of their article, Pamboris and colleagues3 simply state which spreadsheets 
they used and then cite a webpage (www.sportsci.org) that only provides instructions for how to use 
the spreadsheets, not the mathematical theory that underpins them, nor the computations that 
produce the results.13 This makes it hard to vet or replicate the results. For example, we cannot 
determine whether Pamboris and colleagues3 used the correct analysis for comparing the SDS and 
FDS conditions. When comparing conditions in a crossover trial, one needs to account for the within-
person correlation. Pamboris and colleagues3 say they used the “pre‐post parallel groups trial 
spreadsheet” for this analysis, but having downloaded and scrutinized the spreadsheet13—which 
appears only intended only for independent groups—it is unclear whether it correctly handles 
correlated observations. Indeed, we suspect that the MBI approach used treats correlated 
observations as independent, a basic statistical error described in any introductory statistics course.  
Curiously, the necessity for thorough specification of methods is conceded to some degree 
in a commentary appended to the spreadsheets on the www.sportsci.org website: 
“Data analysis through use of the spreadsheet will require careful description in the 
methods section of submitted manuscripts to satisfy those reviewers committed to more 
traditional statistical significance”44 (emphasis added). 
There is a theme here: MBI should be described in whatever terms are necessary for wider 
acceptance. We believe it self-evident that careful description of methods is essential for all 
scientific articles submitted for publication and especially so when the study authors are using 
unconventional and unvalidated methods. How else are we as peers to judge the validity of their 
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particular statistical inclination stands antithetical to the drive for an open research culture45 and 
contributes nothing to remedying the reproducibility problems in scientific research.32-35 
 
Conclusion 
MBI has admirable goals. Researchers should pay less attention to statistical significance and 
more attention to effect-sizes and precision. The devil is in the details, however, and MBI does not 
solve the problems associated with statistical significance testing. For the mathematical and practical 
reasons listed above, MBI increases the number of false positive findings in the literature, does not 
have a reproducible implementation, and does all of these things with a pastiche of Bayesian rigor. 
Thus, far from being a methodological remedy, MBI actually hurts reproducibility. 
Despite regular criticism, the alleged benefits of MBI have led many teams of researchers to 
uncritically apply MBI in their own work. MBI’s creators even write on their website22:  
“MBI has become popular in exercise and sports science, because we have provided 
the tools, and the tools provide the researchers with an avenue for publishing 
previously unpublishable effects from small samples”22 (emphasis added).  
The problem with small studies is that chance variation has a greater relative effect on 
findings, making it more difficult to distinguish real effects from noise. Indeed, it is easily 
demonstrated that we should have less faith in the results of a small study irrespective of whether 
the results are to reject or not reject the null hypothesis. MBI increases the risk of false positives—
interpreting noise as signal—and it is doubly problematic that proponents of MBI specifically 
advocate this as an advantage of their method in the setting of small samples. 
Statistical methods used in medical research studies are reported first in the methodologic 
literature, and are often subject to considerable discussion, debate and testing. For instance, see the 
legitimate debate about significance testing and its appropriate use in different fields of study.46-47 In 
some cases, statistical methods are proposed that are later found to be invalid by other statisticians, 
and their use is then dropped. With MBI, a circuitous path of self-citation suggests rigorous methods 
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statistical journal where its strengths and weaknesses could be empirically tested and debated by 
individuals versed in methods for the evaluation of statistical methods.48 Instead, papers on MBI 
have only been published in sports medicine journals or on the website www.sportsci.org. This 
history can also be seen in how critiques of MBI5-6 are met with counter-arguments19,49 that fail to 
directly address the criticisms raised or math presented20 and never result in modifications or 
adaptations to the method. Instead, proponents of MBI have continually shifted the goal-posts—for 
example, first claiming that MBI has superior Type I and Type II errors19 and then claiming that Type I 
and Type II errors are irrelevant because MBI is a Bayesian method.22  
We have also been struck how MBI proponents have adopted language found more typically 
in cultural and political battles than in science. For instance, in a blog post50 that starts “I am not a 
qualified statistician,” Buchheit states that “MBI changed my life” and describes critiques of MBI 
using phrases such as “battle of position or power,” “close minded-attitudes” and “like … battles of 
religion.” Without engaging substantively with any criticism of MBI, Buchheit says that he “trust[s] 
the analytical foundations of MBI” and that this “trust is based on the following: [Batterman] and 
[Hopkins] are amongst the most highly cited researchers in exercise and sport, their knowledge of 
the inference literature is clearly beyond reproach.” This is us-and-them talk: “they” (established 
statisticians) are close minded and using their power against “us” (MBI users), good people who can 
be trusted; yes, every reputable statistician who has examined MBI has concluded it to be invalid, 
but (with a strange sort of logic) that just shows how biased “they” are.  
To their credit, the creators and proponents of MBI have a deep concern for statistical 
practices in sport and exercise science and have highlighted legitimate issues: over-reliance on 
statistical significance, erroneous “acceptance” of the null hypothesis, persistent publication bias, 
and chronically under-powered studies are all problems. However, correct identification of a 
problem does not provide a solution and there are plenty of means for addressing these problems 
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Regardless of the method of inference, we also need to fix more basic issues: errors in 
experimental design, data integrity, data cleaning and checking, basic statistical literacy, and basic 
logical reasoning.51 We need better statistical education so that researchers understand the 
strengths and limitations of valid analysis methods. We also need a healthy dose of statistical 
respect. Applied statistics is its own discipline with rigorous pipelines for methodological 
development. Researchers should not feel safe behind MBI’s claim of producing a result consistent 
with a “default prior.”48 Flat priors represent very specific assumptions about the nature of reality 
and those assumptions are (almost always) wrong for sport scientists. Furthermore, if one is to 
adopt a prior, it needs to be done in a Bayesian analysis with appropriate justification and sensitivity 
testing. MBI ignores the specification of a prior completely and is thus definitively not Bayesian.     
 MBI has certain superficial similarities with Bayesian statistics. But you cannot send a 
baseball team to England and describe them as cricket players just because they try to hit a ball with 
a bat. The incorrect claim that MBI is a Bayesian analysis is similarly just not cricket, and does real 
damage. This claim has led Pamboris and colleagues4 to assert that, “Nevertheless, readers may be 
assured that our analysis based on Bayesian inference methods and our conclusions are robust.” As 
we have shown however, conclusions drawn from “possible” or “likely” results in MBI are neither 
Bayesian nor robust. MBI is not a valid nor reproducible method of statistical inference and should 
not be used. 
Footnotes:  
aUsing the math and simulations from Sainani 20186, we calculated the Type I error rates (when true 
effect = 0) for the “possible” and “likely” thresholds for a variety of scenarios. The error rates change 
depending on study design, variance, sample size, and MBI parameters, but—when using values 
similar to what we have seen in MBI studies in the literature—were as high as 25% for the “likely” 
threshold and 60% for the “possible” threshold. In the literature we reviewed, MBI practitioners 
predominantly used small studies (median effect size for single group studies was 14 and for multi-
group studies was 10 per group), set the maximum risk of harm at 5%, and treated both directions 
equivalently.  
bThe 90% confidence interval for muscle strain is: 39.8%±56.7%.  
standard error = 56.7/T17,.05=56.7/1.75=32.4% 
T17=
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Figure 1. This figure shows the appropriate inferences that can be drawn from different 95% 
confidence intervals (or 90% for a lower level of confidence, as in the Pamboris paper3) based on 
how they fall relative to the harmful, trivial, and beneficial ranges and contrasts these with the 
incorrect inferences that MBI draws. Shaded 90% confidence interval is similar to the confidence 
interval, -16.9% to 96.5%, for improvement in muscle strain for SDS versus FDS in the paper by 
Pamboris and Colleagues.3 They used this finding as well as several “possibly” beneficial findings to 
justify their conclusion that “SDS showed greater improvement than FDS in both neuromechanical 
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